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In a generalized tournament, players may have an arbitrary number of matches against
each other and the outcome of the games is measured on a cardinal scale with lower
and upper bounds. An axiomatic approach is applied to the problem of ranking the
competitors. Self-consistency (SC) requires assigning the same rank for players with
equivalent results, while a player showing an obviously better performance than another
should be ranked strictly higher. According to order preservation (OP), if two players
have the same pairwise ranking in two tournaments where the same players have played
the same number of matches, then their pairwise ranking is not allowed to change in
the aggregated tournament. We reveal that these two properties cannot be satisfied
simultaneously on this universal domain.
Keywords: Tournament ranking; paired comparison; axiomatic approach; impossibility.
Subject Classification: 91B14
1. Introduction
This paper addresses the problem of tournament ranking when players may have
played an arbitrary number of matches against each other, from an axiomatic point
of view. For instance, the matches among top tennis players lead to a set of similar
data: Andre Agassi has played 14 matches with Boris Becker, but he has never
played against Bjo¨rn Borg [Bozo´ki et al., 2016]. To be more speciﬁc, we show the
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incompatibility of some natural properties. Impossibility theorems are well-known
in the classical theory of social choice [Arrow, 1950; Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite,
1975], but our setting has a crucial diﬀerence: the set of agents and the set of
alternatives coincide, therefore the transitive eﬀects of “voting” should be consid-
ered [Altman and Tennenholtz, 2008]. We also allow for cardinal and incomplete
preferences as well as ties in the ranking derived.
Several characterizations of ranking methods have been suggested in the lit-
erature by providing a set of properties such that they uniquely determine
a given method [Rubinstein, 1980; Bouyssou, 1992; Bouyssou and Perny, 1992;
van den Brink and Gilles, 2003, 2009; Slutzki and Volij, 2005, 2006; Kitti, 2016].
There are some excellent axiomatic analyses, too [Chebotarev and Shamis, 1998;
Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al., 2014].
However, apart from Csato´ [2019b], we know only one work discussing impossi-
bility results for ranking the nodes of a directed graph [Altman and Tennenholtz,
2008], a domain covered by our concept of generalized tournament. We think these
theorems are indispensable for a clear understanding of the axiomatic framework.
For example, Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. [2014] have found that most ranking methods
violate an axiom called order preservation (OP), but it is not known whether this
negative result is caused by a theoretical impossibility or it is only due to some
unhidden features of the procedures that have been considered.
It is especially a relevant issue because of the increasing popularity of sports
rankings [Langville and Meyer, 2012], which is, in a sense, not an entirely new phe-
nomenon, since sports tournaments have motivated some classical works of social
choice and voting theory [Landau, 1895; Zermelo, 1929; Wei, 1952]. For instance, the
ranking of tennis players has been addressed from at least three perspectives, with
the use of methods from multicriteria decision-making [Bozo´ki et al., 2016], net-
work analysis [Radicchi, 2011], or statistics [Baker and McHale, 2014, 2017]. Con-
sequently, the axiomatic approach can be fruitful in the choice of an appropriate
sports ranking method. This issue has been discussed in some recent works [Berker,
2014; Pauly, 2014; Csato´, 2017, 2019a,c,d,e, 2018, 2019f; Dagaev and Sonin, 2018;
Vaziri et al., 2018; Vong, 2017], but there is a great scope for future research.
For this purpose, we will place two properties, imported from the
social choice literature, in the center of the discussion. Self-consistency (SC)
[Chebotarev and Shamis, 1997] requires assigning the same rank for players with
equivalent results, furthermore, a player showing an obviously better performance
than another should be ranked strictly higher. OPa [Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al., 2014]
excludes the possibility of rank reversal by demanding the preservation of players’
pairwise ranking when two tournaments, where the same players have played the
same number of matches, are aggregated. In other words, it is not allowed that
aThe term OP may be a bit misleading since it can suggest that the sequence of matches does not
influence the rankings (see Vaziri et al. [2018, Property III]). This requirement obviously holds in
our setting.
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player A is judged better both in the ﬁrst and second halves of the season than
player B, but ranked lower on the basis of the whole season.
Our main result proves the incompatibility of SC and OP. This ﬁnding gives a
theoretical foundation for the observation of Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. [2014] that most
ranking methods do not satisfy OP. Another important message of the paper is
that prospective users cannot avoid to take similar impossibilities into account and
justify the choice between the properties involved.
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the notion of ranking
problem and scoring methods. Section 3 introduces the property called SC and
proves that one type of scoring methods cannot satisfy it. Section 4 deﬁnes (strong)
OP besides some other properties, addresses the compatibility of the axioms and
derives a negative result by opposing SC and OP. Section 5 summarizes our main
ﬁndings.
2. The Ranking Problem and Scoring Methods
Consider a set of players N = {X1, X2, . . . , Xn}, n ∈ N+ and a series of tournament
matrices T (1), T (2), . . . , T (m) containing information on the paired comparisons of
the players. Their entries are given such that t(p)ij + t
(p)
ji = 1 if players Xi and Xj
have played in round p (1 ≤ p ≤ m) and t(p)ij + t(p)ji = 0 if they have not played
against each other in round p. The simplest deﬁnition can be t(p)ij = 1 (implying
t
(p)
ji = 0) if player Xi has defeated player Xj, and t
(p)
ij = 0 (implying t
(p)
ji = 1) if
player Xi has lost against player Xj in round p. A draw can be represented by
t
(p)
ij = t
(p)
ji = 0.5. The entries may reﬂect the scores of the players, or other features
of the match (e.g., an overtime win has less value than a normal time win), too.
The tuple (N,T (1), T (2), . . . , T (m)), denoted shortly by (N,T), is called a general
ranking problem. The set of general ranking problems with n players (|N | = n) is
denoted by T n.
The aggregated tournament matrix A =
∑m
p=1 T
(p) = [aij ] ∈ Rn×n combines
the results of all rounds of the competition.
The pair (N,A) is called a ranking problem. The set of ranking problems with
n players (|N | = n) is denoted by Rn. Note that every ranking problem can be
associated with several general ranking problems, in this sense, ranking problem is
a narrower notion.
Let (N,A), (N,A′) ∈ Rn be two ranking problems with the same player set N .
The sum of these ranking problems is (N,A+A′) ∈ Rn. For example, the ranking
problems can contain the results of matches in the ﬁrst and second halves of the
season, respectively.
Any ranking problem (N,A) has a skew-symmetric results matrix R = A−A =
[rij ] ∈ Rn×n and a symmetric matches matrix M = A + A = [mij ] ∈ Nn×n. mij
is the number of matches between players Xi and Xj , whose outcome is given by
rij . Matrices R and M also determine the aggregated tournament matrix through
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A = (R + M)/2, so any ranking problem (N,A) ∈ Rn can be denoted analogously
by (N,R,M) with the restriction |rij | ≤ mij for all Xi, Xj ∈ N . Despite description
with results and matches matrices is not parsimonious, this notation will turn out
to be useful.
A general scoring method is a function g : T n → Rn. Several procedures have
been suggested in the literature, see Chebotarev and Shamis [1998] for an overview
of them. A special type of general scoring methods is the following.
Definition 1 (Individual scoring method [Chebotarev and Shamis,
1999]). A general scoring method g : T n → Rn is called individual scoring
method if it is based on individual scores, that is, there exist functions φ and δ
such that for any general ranking problem (N,T) ∈ T n, the corresponding score
vector s = g(N,T) can be expressed as s = δ(s(1), s(2), . . . , s(m)), where the partial
score vectors s(p) = φ(N,T (p)) depend solely on the tournament matrix T (p) of
round p for all p = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
A scoring method is a function f : Rn → Rn. Any scoring method can also be
regarded as a general scoring method — by using the aggregated tournament matrix
instead of the whole series of tournament matrices — therefore some papers only
consider scoring methods [Kitti, 2016; Slutzki and Volij, 2005]. Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al.
[2014] give a thorough axiomatic analysis of certain scoring methods.
In other words, scoring methods initially aggregate the tournament matrices
and then rank the players by their scores, while individual scoring methods ﬁrst
give scores to the players in each round and then aggregate them.
3. An Argument Against the Use of Individual Scoring Methods
In this section, some properties of general scoring methods are presented, which
will highlight an important failure of individual scoring methods.
3.1. Universal invariance axioms
Axiom 1 (Anonymity (ANO)). Let (N,T) ∈ T n be a general ranking prob-
lem, σ : {1, 2, . . . ,m} → {1, 2, . . . ,m} be a permutation on the set of rounds, and
σ(N,T) ∈ T n be the ranking problem obtained from (N,T) by permutation σ.
General scoring method g : T n → Rn is anonymous if gi(N,T) = gi(σ(N,T)) for
all Xi ∈ N .
ANO implies that any reindexing of the rounds (tournament matrices) preserves
the scores of the players.
Axiom 2 (Neutrality (NEU)). Let (N,T) ∈ T n be a general ranking problem,
σ : N → N be a permutation on the set of players, and (σ(N),T) ∈ T n be the
ranking problem obtained from (N,T) by permutation σ. General scoring method
g : T n → Rn is neutral if gi(N,T) = gσ(i)(σ(N),T) for all Xi ∈ N .
NEU means that the scores are independent of the labeling of the players.
1940002-4
In
t. 
G
am
e 
Th
eo
ry
 R
ev
. 2
01
9.
21
. D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.c
om
by
 H
U
N
G
A
RI
A
N
 A
CA
D
EM
Y
 O
F 
SC
IE
N
CE
S 
M
TA
 S
ZT
A
K
I L
IB
RA
RY
 o
n 
09
/2
5/
19
. R
e-
us
e a
nd
 d
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
is 
str
ic
tly
 n
ot
 p
er
m
itt
ed
, e
xc
ep
t f
or
 O
pe
n 
A
cc
es
s a
rti
cl
es
.
April 25, 2019 9:46 WSPC/0219-1989 151-IGTR 1940002
Some Impossibilities of Ranking in Generalized Tournaments
3.2. Self-consistency
Now we want to formulate a further requirement on the ranking of the players
by answering the following question: When is player Xi undeniably better than
player Xj? There are two such plausible cases: (1) if player Xi has achieved better
results against the same opponents; (2) if player Xi has achieved the same results
against stronger opponents. Consequently, player Xi should also be judged better
if he/she has achieved better results against stronger opponents than player Xj .
Furthermore, since (general) scoring methods allow for ties in the ranking, player
Xi should have the same rank as player Xj if he/she has achieved the same results
against opponents with the same strength.
In order to apply these principles, both the results and strengths of the players
should be measured. Results can be extracted from the tournament matrices T (p).
Strengths of the players can be obtained from their scores according to the (general)
scoring method used, hence the name of the implied axiom is self-consistency. It
has been introduced in Chebotarev and Shamis [1997], and extensively discussed
by Csato´ [2019b].
Definition 2 (Opponent multiset). Let (N,T) ∈ T n be a general ranking
problem. The opponent multisetb of player Xi is Oi, which contains mij instances
of Xj .
Players of the opponent multiset Oi are called the opponents of player Xi.
Notation 1. Consider the ranking problem (N,T (p)) ∈ T n given by restricting a
general ranking problem to its pth round. Let Xi, Xj ∈ N be two diﬀerent players
and h(p) : O(p)i ↔ O(p)j be a one-to-one correspondence between the opponents of
Xi and Xj in round p, consequently, |O(p)i | = |O(p)j |. Then h(p) : {k : Xk ∈ O(p)i } ↔
{ : X ∈ O(p)j } is given by Xh(p)(k) = h(p)(Xk).
Axiom 3 (SC [Chebotarev and Shamis, 1997]). A general scoring method
g : T n → Rn is called self-consistent if the following implication holds for any
general ranking problem (N,T) ∈ T n and for any players Xi, Xj ∈ N : if there
exists a one-to-one mapping h(p) from O(p)i onto O
(p)
j such that t
(p)
ik ≥ t(p)jh(p)(k)
and gk(N,T) ≥ gh(p)(k)(N,T) for all p = 1, 2, . . . ,m and Xk ∈ O(p)i , then
fi(N,R,M) ≥ fj(N,R,M), furthermore, fi(N,R,M) > fj(N,R,M) if t(p)ik >
t
(p)
jh(p)(k)
or gk(N,T) > gh(p)(k)(N,T) for at least one 1 ≤ p ≤ m and Xk ∈ O(p)i .
3.3. Individual scoring methods and SC
In this part, it will be proved that an anonymous and neutral individual scoring
method cannot satisfy SC, which is a natural fairness requirement, thus it is enough
bMultiset is a generalization of the concept of set allowing for multiple instances of its elements.
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(a) (N, T (1)) (b) (N, T (2)) (c) (N,T)
Fig. 1. The general ranking problem of Example 1.
to focus on ranking problems and scoring methods. For this purpose, the example
below will be used.
Example 1. Let (N,T (1), T (2)) ∈ T 4 be a general ranking problem describing a
tournament with two rounds.
It is shown in Fig. 1: A directed edge from node Xi to Xj indicates a win of
player Xi over Xj (and a loss of Xj against Xi), while an undirected edge from node
Xi to Xj represents a drawn match between the two players. This representation
will be used in further examples, too.
So, player X1 has defeated X4 in the ﬁrst round (Fig. 1(a)), while players X2
and X3 have not played. In the second round, players X1 and X2, as well as players
X3 and X4 have drawn (Fig. 1(b)). The whole tournament is shown in Fig. 1(c).
According to the following result, at least one property from the set of ANO,
NEU and SC will be violated by any individual scoring method.
Proposition 1. There exists no anonymous and neutral individual scoring method
satisfying SC.
Proof. Let g : T n → Rn be an anonymous and neutral individual scoring method.
Consider Example 1. ANO and NEU imply that g2(N,T (1)) = g3(N,T (1)) and
g2(N,T (2)) = g3(N,T (2)), therefore
g2(N,T) = δ(g2(N,T (1)), g2(N,T (2)))
= δ(g3(N,T (1)), g3(N,T (2))) = g3(N,T). (1)
Note that O(1)1 = {X4}, O(1)1 = {X2} and O(1)4 = {X1}, O(2)4 = {X3}. Take
the one-to-one correspondences h(1)14 : O
(1)
1 ↔ O(1)4 such that h(1)14 (X4) = X1 and
h
(2)
14 : O
(2)
1 ↔ O(2)4 such that h(2)14 (X2) = X3. Now t(2)12 = t(2)43 since the corresponding
matches resulted in draws. Furthermore, t(1)14 = t(1)41 since the value of a win and a
loss should be diﬀerent. It can be assumed without loss of generality that t(1)14 > t
(1)
41 .
Suppose that g1(N,T) ≤ g4(N,T). Then players X1 and X4 have a draw against a
player with the same strength (X2 and X3, respectively), but X1 has defeated X4,
1940002-6
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so it has a better result against a not weaker opponent. Therefore, SC (Axiom 3)
implies g1(N,T) > g4(N,T), which is a contradiction, thus g1(N,T) > g4(N,T)
holds.
However, O(1)2 = ∅, O(2)2 = {X1} and O(1)3 = ∅, O(2)3 = {X4}. Consider the
unique one-to-one correspondence h(2)14 : O
(2)
2 ↔ O(2)3 , which — together with
t
(2)
21 = t
(2)
34 (the two draws should be represented by the same number) and
g1(N,T) > g4(N,T) — leads to g2(N,T) > g3(N,T) because player X2 has
achieved the same result against a stronger opponent than player X3. In other
words, SC requires the draw of X2 to be more valuable than the draw of X3, but
it cannot be reﬂected by any individual scoring method g according to (1).
4. The Case of Ranking Problems and Scoring Methods
According to Proposition 1, only the procedure underlying scoring methods can
be compatible with self-consistency. Therefore, this section will focus on scoring
methods.
4.1. Axioms of invariance with respect to the results matrix
Let O ∈ Rn×n be the matrix with all of its entries being zero.
Axiom 4 (Symmetry (SYM) [Gonza´lez-D´ıaz et al. (2014)]). Let
(N,R,M) ∈ Rn be a ranking problem such that R = O. Scoring method
f : Rn → Rn is symmetric if fi(N,R,M) = fj(N,R,M) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
According to SYM, if all paired comparisons (but not necessarily all matches
in each round) between the players result in a draw, then all players will have the
same score.
Axiom 5 (Inversion (INV) [Chebotarev and Shamis, 1998]). Let (N,R,
M) ∈ Rn be a ranking problem. Scoring method f : Rn → Rn is invertible if
fi(N,R,M) ≥ fj(N,R,M)⇔ fi(N,−R,M) ≤ fj(N,−R,M) for all Xi, Xj ∈ N .
INV means that taking the opposite of all results changes the ranking accord-
ingly. It establishes a uniform treatment of victories and losses.
Corollary 1. Let f : Rn → Rn be a scoring method satisfying INV . Then for all
Xi, Xj ∈ N : fi(N,R,M) > fj(N,R,M)⇔ fi(N,−R,M) < fj(N,−R,M).
The following result has been already mentioned by Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. [2014,
p. 150].
Corollary 2. INV implies SYM.
It seems to be diﬃcult to argue against SYM. However, scoring methods based
on right eigenvectors [Wei, 1952; Slutzki and Volij, 2005, 2006; Kitti, 2016] violate
INV.
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4.2. Properties of independence
The next axiom deals with the eﬀects of certain changes in the aggregated
tournament matrix A.
Axiom 6 (Independence of irrelevant matches (IIM) [Gonza´lez-D´ıaz et al.
(2014)). Let (N,A), (N,A′) ∈ Rn be two ranking problems and Xi, Xj , Xk, X ∈
N be four diﬀerent players such that (N,A) and (N,A′) are identical but ak =
a′k. Scoring method f : Rn → Rn is called independent of irrelevant matches if
fi(N,A) ≥ fj(N,A)⇒ fi(N,A′) ≥ fj(N,A′).
IIM means that “remote” matches — not involving players Xi and Xj — do
not aﬀect the pairwise ranking of players Xi and Xj .
IIM seems to be a powerful property. Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. [2014] state
that “when players have diﬀerent opponents (or face opponents with diﬀerent
intensities), IIM is a property one would rather not have”. Csato´ [2019b] argues
on an axiomatic basis against IIM.
The rounds of a given tournament can be grouped arbitrarily. Therefore, the
following property makes much sense.
Axiom 7 (OP, [Gonza´lez-D´ıaz et al., 2014]). Let (N,A), (N,A′) ∈ Rn be
two ranking problems where all players have played m matches and Xi, Xj ∈ N be
two diﬀerent players. Let f : Rn → Rn be a scoring method such that fi(N,A) ≥
fj(N,A) and fi(N,A′) ≥ fj(N,A′).c f satisﬁes OP if fi(N,A+A′) ≥ fj(N,A+A′),
furthermore, fi(N,A + A′) > fj(N,A + A′) if fi(N,A) > fj(N,A) or fi(N,A′) >
fj(N,A′).
OP is a relatively restricted version of combining ranking problems, which
implies that if player Xi is not worse than player Xj on the basis of some rounds
as well as on the basis of another set of rounds such that all players have played
in each round (so they have played the same number of matches altogether), then
this pairwise ranking should hold after the two distinct set of rounds are considered
jointly.
One can consider a stronger version of order preservation, too.
Axiom 8 (Strong order preservation (SOP), [van den Brink and Gilles,
2009]). Let (N,A), (N,A′) ∈ Rn be two ranking problems and Xi, Xj ∈ N be two
players. Let f : Rn → Rn be a scoring method such that fi(N,A) ≥ fj(N,A) and
fi(N,A′) ≥ fj(N,A′). f satisﬁes SOP if fi(N,A+A′) ≥ fj(N,A+A′), furthermore,
fi(N,A + A′) > fj(N,A + A′) if fi(N,A) > fj(N,A) or fi(N,A′) > fj(N,A′).
In contrast to OP, SOP does not contain any restriction on the number of
matches of the players in the ranking problems to be aggregated.
cGonza´lez-Dı´az et al. [2014] formally introduce a stronger version of this axiom since only Xi
and Xj should have the same number of matches in the two ranking problems. However, in the
counterexample of Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. [2014], which shows the violation of OP by several ranking
methods, all players have played the same number of matches.
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Corollary 3. SOP implies OP.
It will turn out that the weaker property, order preservation has still
unfavourable implications.
4.3. Relations among the axioms
In this part, some links among SYM, INV, IIM, and (strong) OP will be revealed.
Remark 1. SYM and OP (SOP) imply INV.
Proof. Consider a ranking problem (N,R,M) ∈ Rn where fi(N,R,M) ≥
fj(N,R,M) for players Xi, Xj ∈ N . If fi(N,−R,M) > fj(N,−R,M), then fi(N,
O, 2M) > fj(N,O, 2M) due to OP, which contradicts to SYM. So fi(N,−R,M) ≤
fj(N,−R,M) holds.
It turns out that IIM is also closely connected to SOP.
Proposition 2. A scoring method satisfying NEU, SYM and SOP meets IIM.
Proof. Assume to the contrary, and let (N,R,M) ∈ Rn be a ranking prob-
lem, f : Rn → Rn be a scoring method satisfying NEU, SYM, and SOP, and
Xi, Xj , Xk, X ∈ N be four diﬀerent players such that fi(N,R,M) ≥ fj(N,R,M),
and (N,R′,M ′) ∈ Rn is identical to (N,R,M) except for the result r′k and number
of matches m′k between players Xk and X, where fi(N,R
′,M ′) < fj(N,R′,M ′).
According to Remark 1, f satisﬁes INV, hence fi(N,−R,M) ≤ fj(N,−R,M).
Denote by σ : N → N the permutation σ(Xi) = Xj, σ(Xj) = Xi, and σ(Xk) = Xk
for all Xk ∈ N\{Xi, Xj}. NEU leads to fi[σ(N,R,M)] ≤ fj[σ(N,R,M)], and
fi[σ(N,−R′,M ′)] < fj [σ(N,−R′,M ′)] due to INV and Corollary 1. With the nota-
tions R′′ = σ(R)−σ(R′)−R+R′ = O and M ′′ = σ(M)+σ(M ′)+M +M ′, we get
(N,R′′,M ′′) = σ(N,R,M) + σ(N,−R′,M ′) + (N,−R,M) + (N,R′,M ′).
SYM implies fi(N,R′′,M ′′) = fj(N,R′′,M ′′) since R′′ = O, but fi(N,R′′,M ′′) <
fj(N,R′′,M ′′) from SOP, which is a contradiction.
It remains to be seen whether NEU, SYM, and SOP are all necessary for Propo-
sition 2.
Lemma 1. NEU, SYM, and SOP are logically independent axioms with respect to
the implication of IIM.
Proof. It is shown that there exist scoring methods, which satisfy exactly two
properties from the set NEU, SYM, and SOP, but violate the third and does not
meet IIM, too:
(1) SYM and SOP: The sum of the results of the “previous” player, fi(N,R,M) =∑n
j=1 ri−1,j for all Xi ∈ N\{X1} and f1(N,R,M) =
∑n
j=1 rn,j ;
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(2) NEU and SOP: Maximal number of matches of other players, fi(N,R,M) =
max{∑nk=1 mjk : Xj = Xi}d;
(3) NEU and SYM: Aggregated sum of the results of opponents, fi(N,R,M) =∑
Xj∈Oi
∑n
k=1 rjk.
Proposition 2 helps in deriving another impossibility statement.
Proposition 3. There exists no scoring method that satisﬁes NEU, SYM, SOP
and SC.
Proof. According to Proposition 2, NEU, SYM and SOP imply IIM. Csato´ [2019b,
Theorem 3.1] has shown that IIM and SC cannot be met at the same time.
4.4. A basic impossibility result
The four axioms of Proposition 3 are not independent despite Lemma 1. However,
a much stronger statement can be obtained by eliminating NEU and SYM, which
also allows for a weakening of SOP by using OP. Note that substituting an axiom
with a weaker one in an impossibility statement leads to a stronger result.
We will use a generalized tournament with four players for this purpose.
Example 2. Let (N,R,M), (N,R′,M ′) ∈ R4 be two ranking problems. They are
shown in Fig. 2: in the ﬁrst tournament described by (N,R,M), matches between
players X1 and X2, X1 and X4, X2 and X3, X3 and X4 all resulted in draws (see
Fig. 2(a)). On the other side, in the second tournament, described by (N,R′,M ′),
players X1 and X2 have lost against X3 and drawn against X4 (see Fig. 2(b)). The
two ranking problems can be summed in (N,R′′,M ′′) ∈ R4 such that R′′ = R+R′
and M ′′ = M + M ′ (see Fig. 2(c)).
Theorem 1. There exists no scoring method that satisﬁes OP and SC.
(a) (N,R,M) (b) (N,R′,M ′) (c) (N,R+R′,M +M ′)
Fig. 2. The ranking problems of Example 2.
dIt is worth to note that the maximal number of own matches satisfies NEU, SOP and IIM.
1940002-10
In
t. 
G
am
e 
Th
eo
ry
 R
ev
. 2
01
9.
21
. D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.c
om
by
 H
U
N
G
A
RI
A
N
 A
CA
D
EM
Y
 O
F 
SC
IE
N
CE
S 
M
TA
 S
ZT
A
K
I L
IB
RA
RY
 o
n 
09
/2
5/
19
. R
e-
us
e a
nd
 d
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
is 
str
ic
tly
 n
ot
 p
er
m
itt
ed
, e
xc
ep
t f
or
 O
pe
n 
A
cc
es
s a
rti
cl
es
.
April 25, 2019 9:46 WSPC/0219-1989 151-IGTR 1940002
Some Impossibilities of Ranking in Generalized Tournaments
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exists a self-consistent scoring method
f : Rn → Rn satisfying OP. Consider Example 2.
(1) Take the ranking problem (N,R,M). Note that O1 = O3 = {X2, X4} and
O2 = O4 = {X1, X3}.
(a) Consider the identity one-to-one correspondences h13 : O1 ↔ O3 and h31 :
O3 ↔ O1 such that h13(X2) = h31(X2) = X2 and h13(X4) = h31(X4) =
X4. Since r12 = r32 = 0 and r14 = r34 = 0, players X1 and X3 have the
same results against the same opponents, hence f1(N,R,M) = f3(N,R,M)
from SC.
(b) Consider the identity one-to-one correspondences h24 : O2 ↔ O4 and h42 :
O4 ↔ O2. Since r21 = r41 = 0 and r23 = r43 = 0, players X2 and X4
have the same results against the same opponents, hence f2(N,R,M) =
f4(N,R,M) from SC.
(c) Suppose that f2(N,R,M) > f1(N,R,M), which implies f4(N,R,M) >
f3(N,R,M). Consider the one-to-one mapping h12 : O1 ↔ O2, where
h12(X2) = X1 and h12(X4) = X3. Since r12 = r21 = 0 and r14 = r23 = 0,
player X1 has the same results against stronger opponents compared to
X2, hence f1(N,R,M) > f2(N,R,M) from SC, which is a contradiction.
(d) An analogous argument shows that f1(N,R,M) > f2(N,R,M) cannot
hold.
Therefore, SC leads to f1(N,R,M) = f2(N,R,M) = f3(N,R,M) = f4(N,
R,M) in the ﬁrst ranking problem.
(2) Take the ranking problem (N,R′,M ′). Note that O′1 = O
′
2 = {X3, X4} and
O′3 = O
′
4 = {X1, X2}.
(a) Consider the identity one-to-one correspondences h′12 : O′1 ↔ O′2 and h′21 :
O′2 ↔ O′1. Since r′13 = r′23 = −1 and r′14 = r′24 = 0, players X1 and X2
have the same results against the same opponents, hence f1(N,R′,M ′) =
f2(N,R′,M ′) from SC.
(b) Consider the identity one-to-one correspondence h′34 : O
′
3 ↔ O′4. Since 1 =
r′31 > r
′
41 = 0 and 1 = r
′
32 > r
′
42 = 0, player X3 has better results against
the same opponents compared to X4, hence f3(N,R′,M) > f4(N,R′,M)
from SC.
So SC leads to f1(N,R′,M ′) = f2(N,R′,M ′) and f3(N,R′,M ′) >
f4(N,R′,M ′) in the second ranking problem.
(3) Take the sum of these two ranking problems, the ranking problem (N,R′′,M ′′).
Suppose that f1(N,R′′,M ′′) ≥ f2(N,R′′,M ′′). Consider the one-to-one
mappings g21 : O2 ↔ O1 and g′21 : O′2 ↔ O′1 such that g21(X1) = X2, g21(X3) =
X4 and g′21(X3) = X3, g
′
21(X4) = X4. Since r21 = r12 = 0, r23 = r14 = 0 and
r′23 = r
′
13 = −1, r′24 = r′14 = 0, player X2 has the same results against stronger
opponents compared to X1, hence f2(N,R′′,M ′′) > f1(N,R′′,M ′′) from SC,
which leads to a contradiction.
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To summarize, SC results in f1(N,R′′,M ′) < f2(N,R′′,M ′′), however, OP
implies f1(N,R′′,M ′′) = f2(N,R′′,M ′′) as all players have played two matches
in (N,R′,M ′) and (N,R′,M ′), respectively, which is impossible.
Therefore, it has been derived that no scoring method can meet OP and SC
simultaneously on the universal domain of Rn.
Theorem 1 is a serious negative result: by accepting SC, the ranking method
cannot be required to preserve two players’ pairwise ranking when some ranking
problems, where all players have played the same number of matches, are aggre-
gated.
Example 3. Let (N,R,M) ∈ R4 be the ranking problem in Fig. 3: X1 has drawn
against X2, X2 against X3 and X3 against X4.
Theorem 1 would be more straightforward as a strengthening of Proposition 3
if SC implies NEU and/or SYM. However, it is not the case as the following result
holds.
Remark 2. There exists a scoring method that is self-consistent, but not neutral
and symmetric.
Proof. The statement can be veriﬁed by an example where an SC-compatible
scoring method violates NEU and SYM.
Consider Example 3 with a scoring method f such that f1(N,R,M) >
f2(N,R,M) > f3(N,R,M) > f4(N,R,M), for example, player Xi gets the score
4 − i. f meets SC since X1 has the same result against a stronger opponent com-
pared to X4, while there exists no correspondence between opponent sets O2 and
O3 satisfying the conditions of SC.
Let σ : N → N be a permutation such that σ(X1) = X4, σ(X2) = X3, σ(X3) =
X2, and σ(X4) = X1. Since σ(N,R,M) = (N,R,M), NEU implies f4(N,R,M) >
f1(N,R,M) and f3(N,R,M) > f2(N,R,M), a contradiction. Furthermore, SYM
leads to f1(N,R,M) = f2(N,R,M) = f3(N,R,M) = f4(N,R,M), another impos-
sibility. Therefore, there exists a self-consistent scoring method, which is not neutral
and symmetric.
Fig. 3. The ranking problem of Example 3.
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5. Conclusions
We have found some unexpected implications of diﬀerent properties in the case
of generalized tournaments where the players should be ranked on the basis of
their match results against each other. First, SC prohibits the use of individual
scoring methods, that is, scores cannot be derived before the aggregation of tour-
nament rounds (Proposition 1). Second, independence of irrelevant matches (posing
a kind of independence concerning the pairwise ranking of two players) follows from
three axioms, NEU (independence of relabeling the players), SYM (implying a ﬂat
ranking if all aggregated comparisons are draws), and SOP (perhaps the most nat-
ural property concerning the aggregation of ranking problems). According to Csato´
[2019b], there exists no scoring method satisfying SC and IIM, hence Proposition 2
implies that NEU, SYM, SOP and SC cannot be met simultaneously (Proposi-
tion 3). It even turns out that SC and a weaker version of SOP are still enough to
derive this negative result (Theorem 1), consequently, one should choose between
these two natural fairness requirements.
What do our results say to practitioners who want to rank players or teams?
First, SC does not allow to rank them in individual rounds, one has to wait until all
tournament results are known and can be aggregated. Second, SC is not compatible
with OP on this universal domain. It is not an unexpected and counter-intuitive
result as, according to Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. [2014], a number of ranking methods
violate OP. We have proved that there is no hope to ﬁnd a reasonable scoring
method with this property. From a more abstract point of view, breaking of OP in
tournament ranking is a version of Simpson’s paradox, a phenomenon in probability
and statistics, in which a trend appears in diﬀerent groups of data but disappears
or reverses when these groups are combined.e This negative result holds despite SC
is somewhat weaker than our intuition suggests: it does not imply NEU and SYM,
so even a self-consistent ranking of players may depend on their names and without
ties if all matches are drawn (Remark 2). Third, losing the simplicity provided by
OP certainly does not facilitate the axiomatic construction of scoring methods.
Consequently, while sacriﬁcing SC or OP seems to be unavoidable in our general
setting, an obvious continuation of the current research is to get positive possibility
results by some domain restrictions or further weakening of the axioms. It is also
worth to note that the incompatibility of the two axioms does not imply that any
scoring method is always going to work badly, but all can lead to problematic results
at times.
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